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Anyone who has spent any significant time within any of the world’s best
intelligence communities will have encountered the term, “Five Eyes.” My
first exposure was early during intelligence school when my first
assumption was “Five Eyes” was another high performance imaging
satellite to memorize for a quiz. The actual truth reaches significantly
further. Anthony Wells’ book, Between Five Eyes describes fifty years of
intelligence sharing practices for U.S., Australian, Canadian, U.K. and New
Zealand Intelligence agencies. The work begins with Wells’ personal
experiences as a Ph.D. student and British Naval Surface Warfare Officer
before expanding to include his more recent perceptions during a lifetime
working as an intelligence professional. Never leaving behind his initial
nautical focus, his experiences carry him through today’s challenges and
include highlighting the author’s change from British military officer to an
American citizen and paid political consultant. More of a treatise on how
intelligence aids in creating solutions than a historical approach towards
the Five Eyes partnership, the book mirrors the overall alliance through
demonstrating potential greatness mired within the toil of daily life.
Pursuing a chronological path, Wells wanders from the partnership’s
World War II beginnings as an outgrowth of Franklin Roosevelt’s and
Winston Churchill’s Allied conferences. The need to overcome the Axis
powers led to developing the now famous cryptologic projects originating
at Bletchley Park and eventually to cracking the German’s Enigma
machine as well as defeating the Japanese Purple code. Briefly touching on
how U.S. defense restructured in 1947, the trail leads on to the creation of
shared US and UK practices with the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1961
mirroring the UK’s Defense Intelligence staff in 1964, as well as creating
paired naval intelligence organizations. Wells focuses on the National
Reconnaissance Office’s contributions to satellite reconnaissance as a
central block in the Five Eyes, but spends only a single line during the
early development chapter on the relationship between the National
Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters
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(GCHQ). Collection from the satellite systems is an essential part of
intelligence operations but focusing on collection over analysis and
production leaves some gaps in transitioning to actionable intelligence.
The book concentrates throughout on Wells’ personal experience with
intelligence elements.
The journey begins during the author’s doctoral studies in the late 1960s,
pursuing the historical effects of intelligence on the British military.
Transitioning afterwards to sea duty, he followed that with working
directly with American experts planning “Sea War 1985” as a UK liaison to
help build a future naval warfare outlook. Despite leaving before
completing the plan, he still managed to learn the importance of signals
intelligence practices and coalition sharing as related to tracking difficult
targets under challenging circumstances. Matching this experience with an
English law degree, Wells highlights the three characteristics
underpinning a lasting Five Eyes relationship: The need to be constantly
prepared for a dynamic threat, the ability of alliances to strengthen
responsiveness, and a commitment to allowing self-determination and
self-government globally. Despite this second section’s concentration on
intelligence developments from 1976 to 1983, more than two-thirds of the
section discusses prior developments. After returning to England, Wells
worked counter-intelligence practices rather than traditional ISR
functions such as collection, reporting, production, or analysis.
The next section explores from 1983 to 2001, with the experience
becoming less personal and more focused on global threat changes rather
than Wells’ individual interaction. Disappointingly, the book increasingly
emphasizes naval warfare developments rather than a holistic approach
towards changing intelligence practices. For example, Wells highlights the
Tomahawk missile as an example of the precision guided weapon
primarily used during the initial Gulf War with 288 missiles fired at about
1,000 lbs each or 144 tons. This compares poorly to the close to 8,000 tons
of precision munitions employed by the coalition air forces. Again,
returning to naval practices despite significant world upheaval, the
chapter’s largest portion discusses a Fleet Battle Experiment to integrate
intelligence with the current command and control practices. Largely
missing are any discussions of the Soviet Union’s downfall, engagement in
Afghanistan, the Strategic Defense Initiative’s acceleration of space, or
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even the ten years after the Gulf War spent enforcing Iraq’s Northern and
Southern No-Fly Zones.
Moving on to events following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, the
book again wanders away from an intelligence focus to contemplate more
esoteric discussions about privacy challenges, the emergence of cyber,
Middle East policy, and intelligence separations. Many of these touch on
intelligence practices but are more directly driven by each nation’s culture
than any Five Eyes consolidated approach. Wells completely ignores the
second Gulf War and the conflict in Afghanistan, and he just briefly
mentions the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) resurgence. Even
more interesting, he relates ISIS’ foundation to first Gulf War effects
rather than Iraq’s American occupation from 2003-2011. Many analysts
prefer to attribute ISIS’ rise to the inability of the Iraqi government to
clamp down on internal militias once faced with a dedicated date for the
American military’s withdraw. The final chapter considers future conflict
areas without settling on any one area.
The intelligence discussions contained were enjoyable, but two areas
proved disappointing after the Between Five Eyes marketing campaign:
the lack of historical explanation about more recent developments and the
emphasis on naval intelligence improvements. Numerous intelligence
works exist from individual agencies’ perspectives such as James
Bamford’s books on the National Security Agency, volumes of work on the
Central Intelligence agency, or even Vasili Mitrokhin’s works with
Christopher Andrew on the KGB, but this appears to be the first dedicated
to the Five Eyes partnership. Each of the other volumes builds personal
and episodic approaches to developing and employing intelligence. The
wide scope attempted by Wells falls short of the mark for me. Perhaps a
better approach would have been to limit the sub-title to, “Fifty Years of
Naval Intelligence Sharing.” The overall descriptions are accurate and
potentially useful for those new to the area, but lack the dedicated insight
more experienced intelligence professionals might desire.
Overall, Between Five Eyes makes for a pleasant read without challenging
any of the reader’s preconceptions about national alliances or intelligence
integration practiced daily by each of these great countries. The
chronological approach starts well, although the period after 1990 appears
in five consecutive chapters. Dr. Wells perhaps should have pursued a
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more topic-centric approach to deliver key aspects regarding how the
different nations pursued partnerships across different areas. The book
reads quickly, is exceptionally well-written as befits the author’s long
academic experience and contains the occasional insight. Those less
familiar with intelligence agencies will likely enjoy the discussion and I
would recommend it to those just beginning their historical journey into
global intelligence practices and strategies.
Mark T. Peters II, USAF, Retired
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